Monday, February 5, 2007

Attention jurisdiction geeks....


Sean Sirrine, a 1L at Lewis & Clark and one of the bloggers at Blog De Novo, recently posted there on Shisler v. Sanfer Sports Cars (--- Cal.Rptr.3d ----, 2006 WL 3735715), and wondered how both a California Superior Court judge and a Court of Appeals board could fail to find California jurisdiction in, as he put it, a “cut-and-dry” case of minimum contacts jurisdiction, and suggested that the California Supreme Court might take the case up at some point. I respectfully disagree, and will present my analysis of the jurisdictional issues in the case after the jump (I would post it on his site, but I am having some trouble with posting comments).

I’m mostly happy that there are other 1L’s out there that find jurisdiction interesting, and really just want to put my own newly-developed jurisidiction analysis skills to work. But... if there are any District Court judges reading this who would like a summer intern who gets off on jurisdictional analysis, feel free to contact me!

If minimum contacts doesn’t make you want to stand up and shout “Hallelujah!”, then you probably don’t want to click here.


Here are the facts in Shisler: Defendant is a Florida corporation in the business of selling autos with it’s principal place of business in Florida. Defendant maintains a website that is non-interactive, and is available to anyone with internet access. Plaintiff is a California resident. Plaintiff found Defendant’s website, and contacted defendant to purchase one of the cars he saw advertised on the site. The court found that the contract to sell an auto was formed in Florida, and the title transferred to Plaintiff in Florida when the auto was delivered to the third party shipper who eventually conveyed the auto to Plaintiff in California. Plaintiff alleges that the car is not as warranted, and filed a suit alleging breach of contract in California. Defendant filed a motion to quash service of summons on jurisdictional grounds, which was granted by the trial court and affirmed on appeal.

Mr. Sirrine contends that the above courts erred in relying on Pavlovich v. Superior Court (29 Cal.4th 262, 2002) and other decisions’ analysis of whether or not Defendant’s website constituted a basis for specific jurisdiction. Instead, Mr. Sirrine seems to think that the courts should have found that Defendant’s shipping of a car in this instance, as well as the sale of at least 10 other cars to California residents, constituted contacts so continuous, systematic and substantial that California may exert jurisdiction. Says Mr. Sirrine:


The court then goes on to explain how the web site at issue didn't target California residents and so on, but never discusses the fact that a car was purchased by a California resident and actually delivered to him. In fact, the whole rest of the opinion fails to even discuss the facts found in the case. This case is not about sending files over the internet, it is about a contract for the purchase of a car which was delivered to California. (The court notes that there were at least 10 sales of vehicles from this salesman to California using the web site.)

And later:

I could understand the opinion if the plaintiff were trying to serve the defendant on an issue not relevant to their transaction, (say a libel claim), but this case is a cut and-dry example of a situation in which personal jurisdiction should have been found.

I expect we will see this case at the California Supreme Court in the near future.


The jurisdiction of California courts is, of course, restricted to the constitutional limits, and California has a long-arm statute that allows jurisdiction to the extent of those limits. The court in Shisler correctly summarized the rule for the exercise of Specific jurisdiction in California and other states that observe the constitutional limits: “(1) ‘the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the “controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ [the] defendant’s contacts with the forum” ’ [citations]; and (3) ‘ “the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.).”

What Mr. Sirrine has missed is the “purposeful availment” analysis that comes from Hanson v. Denckla (358 U.S. 858, 1958), and is embodied in prong one of the test laid out in Shisler. In the context of commercial transactions contracted at a distance, SCOTUS has found in Hanson, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (471 U.S. 462, 1985) and arguably in Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court (480 U.S. 102, 1987) that, generally, if a defendant doesn’t actively seek out business in a particular forum, they will not be subject to jurisdiction in that forum. However, Asahi did muddle things a bit, so it is not entirely clear how the SC would rule on a jurisdiction question similar to the one presented in Shisler, and indeed there is a state split on this question (according to my CivPro Professor, Eastern mercantilist states tend to find jurisdiction on these facts, while Western agrarian states find no jurisdiction, as California here).

For an example, see Conn v. Whitmore (9 Utah 2d 250, 1959), where the Utah SC found that a Illinois judgment had no validity in Utah because of lack of jurisdiction in Illinois. In that case, a Illinois plaintiff sent a advertisement to a Utah resident in regard to a mare he had for sale. Utah Defendant agreed to purchase the mare, and mailed his down payment to Illinois. Upon receiving the mare he decided it wasn’t as warranted, and discontinued payments. Plaintiff filed a suit for breach in Illinois. The Utah SC found that the defendant’s entering into a contract with a plaintiff in Illinois did not constitute jurisdiction in that state because defendant did not initiate the transaction, and therefore did not “purposefully avail” himself of the protection of the Illinois laws.

The California Court of Appeals has explicitly adopted this approach in Belmont Industries v. Superior Court (31 Cal.App.3d 281, 1973), citing Conn.

Of course, the facts in Conn are different than in Shisler, in that the seller is the plaintiff in Conn and the buyer is the plaintiff in Shisler. However, I do not believe that is relevant, as both are related to a business transaction and one party’s breach of contract (failure to provide merchandise as warranted in one, failure to make payment in the other). In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall (466 U.S. 408, 1984), the court found a distinction between purchases and sales as it related to general jurisdiction (it makes sense in general jurisdiction, because if a party were subject to general jurisdiction in a forum solely on the basis of purchases, that would greatly discourage inter-state trade and would be contrary to public policy), but I know of no case that finds such applicability in the context of specific jurisdiction, “arising from” the specific transaction that is the subject of the suit. Rather, the focus is, as always, on the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.

In this case, the defendant’s relationship to California and the litigation is that a California resident called him up and asked him to sell and ship him a car. Defendant did not advertise in California (with the exception of the website, which is why Pavlovich and Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. (52 F.Supp. 1119, 1997) figure so prominently in this case), and therefore did not “purposefully avail” himself of the protections of California laws. Should a defendant be subject to the jurisdiction of every person who, unsolicited, calls him up and asks him to sell him a car? Or should the defendant refuse the business of any non-Floridian, on the basis that accepting their business would subject him to being haled into the courts of the purchaser’s residence? I think not, and am fairly certain the California Supreme Court would agree.

There are also no convenience factors in play here, as Plaintiff can easily sue Defendant in Florida, and there is no obvious evidentiary concerns.

While I believe this is a case that is somewhat near the margins of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, I hardly agree with Mr. Sirrine that this is a “cut and dry” case where the court should have found jurisdiction. Rather, I think the weight of precedent, both California and constitutional, goes against jurisdiction here, and that the question of whether or not the internet advertising constitutes minimum contacts is, indeed, the controlling question (and as the law stands now under Pavlovich and Zippo, there is clearly not jurisdiction on the basis of Defendant’s non-interactive website, as the court in Shinsler also held).


2 comments:

Sean Sirrine said...

I enjoyed your analysis and hope to discuss this case with you again at length, but I am currently "snowed-under" by school work. (If only I could concentrate on the fun stuff.) The one point that I have to agree with you on is that it is far from "cut-and-dry" because of the muddle the courts have made of this issue. However, as a purely legal abstraction I do think this case is cut-and-dry.

Your analysis is right on the mark, (and far more thorough than what I have written on the subject), but I think you failed to analyze an important distinction.

I think the language found within is probably the most on point and I'd like to refer to two particular passages (I apologize for the citation omission, but as I said, I'm pretty swamped):

Here, LiVid's Web site merely posts information and has no interactive features. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the site targeted California. Indeed, there is no evidence that any California resident ever visited, much less downloaded the DeCSS source code from, the LiVid Web site. Thus, Pavlovich's alleged "conduct in ... posting [a] passive Web site[ ] on the Internet is not," by itself, "sufficient to subject" him "to jurisdiction in California." (Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1060, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 611 (JDO ), fn. omitted [refusing to exercise jurisdiction under the effects test even though the defendant had "passive Web sites on the Internet"]; Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. (9th Cir.1997) 130 F.3d 414, 419-420 [refusing to exercise jurisdiction under the effects test even though the defendant posted infringing material on its Web site]; but see Bunn-O-Matic I, supra, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at p. 1377 [suggesting that the operation of a Web site, by itself, is sufficient to establish express aiming at the forum state].) " 'Creating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide--or even worldwide--but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state.' " (Cybersell, at p. 418, quoting Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King (S.D.N.Y.1996) 937 F.Supp. 295, 301, affd. (2d Cir.1997) 126 F.3d 25.)

Pavlovich v. Superior Court 29 Cal.4th 262, *274, 58 P.3d 2, **10, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, ***339 (Cal.,2002)



And this passage as well:

Because nothing in the record suggests that Pavlovich encouraged Web site visitors to use DeCSS to illegally pirate copyrighted motion pictures, his mere "awareness" they might do so does not show purposeful availment. (See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 112, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (plur. opn. of O'Connor, J.) [the mere awareness that third parties will sweep the defendant's product into the forum state does not convert its act of selling the product to third parties "into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State"].)

Pavlovich v. Superior Court 29 Cal.4th 262, *276, 58 P.3d 2, **12, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, ***341 (Cal.,2002)




So the Web site by itself isn't enough to show that there is purposeful availment, but you are arguing that the defendant actually taking action to put his product in California is not enough of an availment?




Here two citations from a case involving a church sending a pedophile into the state of California (these citations are even worse, I apologize):

Did the Milwaukee Archdiocese engage in intentional conduct expressly aimed at or targeting California, knowing the intentional conduct would cause harm in this state? The evidence supports the conclusion the Milwaukee Archdiocese intentionally sent Widera to California to get him out of Wisconsin where he had been convicted of sexual perversion against a boy and could create further problems for the Milwaukee Archdiocese. As the trial court concluded, "the evidence is certainly sufficient to show that the Archdiocese of Milwaukee chose to place this troublesome member of its clergy here in California as a sort of lend-lease program with the hope that he would be out of their sight and out of their jurisdiction." The evidence supported the conclusion the Milwaukee Archdiocese knew Widera was a pedophile and posed a serious threat of sexually abusing boys in California. By sending a known pedophile into California, the Milwaukee Archdiocese aimed its intentional conduct directly at this state. The brunt of the harm, indeed all of the harm, resulted in California. Having sent Widera into California knowing he was a convicted child abuser and a pedophile, the Milwaukee **168 Archdiocese reasonably could expect to be haled into court in California to answer for the consequences of its actions.

Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Superior Court112 Cal.App.4th 423, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 154 Cal.App. 4 Dist.,2003.

and:

In Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pages 460-467, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 899, 926 P.2d 1085, the California Supreme Court firmly rejected a proximate cause test for analyzing the relation between the defendant's forum contacts and the plaintiff's claims in determining specific jurisdiction. "To require that the injury be proximately caused by the forum contact is to require that the injury 'arise out of' the forum contact in the strictest sense. Such a requirement is inconsistent with the formulation that appears in [United States Supreme Court authority].... [Citations.] ... [and] is inconsistent with the relevant standard in Cornelison [v. Chaney ]...." (Id. at p. 462, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 899, 926 P.2d 1085.)

Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Superior Court112 Cal.App.4th 423, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 154 Cal.App. 4 Dist.,2003.



I think a careful reading of Pavlovich leads to the conclusion that if you avail yourself of the forum, (say, make money by selling products directly to citizens of the forum), you will find yourself within that jurisdiction.

Like I said, I'll be glad to take this up with you some more later. next week will be a bit better for me, but I wanted to at least defend myself. ;)

Dave said...

Thanks for your response, Sean. Three points while I waste some time in CrimPro (talk about the courts making a muddle of things!):

1)You wrote: "The one point that I have to agree with you on is that it is far from "cut-and-dry" because of the muddle the courts have made of this issue. However, as a purely legal abstraction I do think this case is cut-and-dry."

I gather that by this comment that you believe that there is some sort of inherent or "legal abstraction" concept of jurisdiction more akin to natural law than the "muddle" the courts have made of it. I would have to say that I disagree... in my more relativistic approach, jurisdiction is what precedent says it is. When I suggested that things were "muddled" by Asahi, it was simply to say that that decision was a bit of a mess, and it was difficult to ascertain what the various opinions and concurrences were trying to say. However, I am not of the opinion that SCOTUS "got it wrong" and am not making an argument that there *shouldn't* be jurisdiction in this case, contrary to some other viewpoint (though I happen to agree that there shouldn't be jurisdiction, as that would would be unfair in my opinion). I think the precedent is pretty clear that there is not jurisdiction in this case, and that few, if any, judges would find jurisdiction here (with the possible exception of the ghost of Brennan). As both the trial court and court of appeals have found no jx here (and did not think it even close), I guess to be convinced I would need more than exhortations to "carefully read" Pavlovich, and suggestions that I failed to analyze an "important distinction," without any reference to what that distinction might be.

2) I think your reliance on Archdiocese of Milwaukee and Vons is counter to your argument when analyzed in the light of my contention that Shisler lacks *purposeful* availment. Archdiocese reflects the purposeful sending of a minister to California (which is why they focus on "intentional").

3) Which is really part of the third point: as I said originally, you are ignoring the "purposeful" requirement. "Purposeful" reflects something more than the doing of something (for example, shipping something to another state). In Hanson v. Denckla, which established the purposeful requirement, the court held that just because a company was engaged in a business transaction with a person in Florida did not subject them to jurisdiction in that state because the Defendant did not seek out the business in that state (their customer moved there), and that therefore minimum contacts must be "purposeful," which has generally been interpreted to mean that the defendant must seek out the business in the forum state if that business is what is contended to be the contacts that the COA arises out of. The long range of cases on jx have all contended that the basis of specific jx is gthe relationship btwn the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.

In Shisler, the COA arises out of the Plaintiff's activity in Florida, namely, calling up a Florida business and entering into a contract with them in Florida. That the car was then shipped to California is immaterial, both because it is not "purposeful" activity on the part of the Defendant and because the COA does not arise out of the shipping of a car to California (it arises out of a breach of contract formed in Florida). You yourself quote Pavlovich: "'Creating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide--or even worldwide--but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state.'"

The "more" that Pavlovich is looking for is an active seeking of business in the forum state (purposeful availment), which is why the website is relevant and the shipping of the car is not. Indeed, a "careful" reading of Pavlovich is required!